I completed my rotating internship
on 30
Jun 50 and set out on a 40-day trip by car, which would put me in
San Francisco,
onto a
ship with my bride and possessions, for a 2-year tour of duty in
Occupied Japan
as I a Medical Officer. On July 5, I was contacted and told to report
at once
to Fairfield-Suisun AFB,
California
for air transport to Far East I Command. TFS first made contact with
NKPA
forces on this date. It took 34 hours for the flight to
Tokyo
via MATS cargo plane, fitted out with
bucket seats. There was an overnight stop in Tokyo, a DC3 flight to
Korea and
an RTO to 24 Div Hq where I was assigned as Bn Surgeon to 1 Bn 21 IR,
arriving
there on 19 July 1950, 2 weeks after hostilities began.
There had been no opportunity for
military
or medical orientation. At that time the 21 IR, consisting of 2
undermanned and
decimated
battalions was in what was euphemistically called
“reserve”, in a resting situation while it licked
its wounds, southeast of
Taejon near a road with 2 tunnels which had been mined for the
possibility that
the area might have to be evacuated; this came true within a week as
Taejon
fell.
It was necessary for all personnel,
including medical, to wear sidearms or carry a carbine -- the Red Cross
emblem
was no protection.
Regular Army personnel who had seen
service
during WWII appeared to be knowledgeable about military structure; they
were
heavily depended upon. The majority of these men were NCOs or company
grade
officers.
The roads swarmed with refugees
attempting
to escape from North Korean forces. Largely on foot, with an occasional
ox-cart, they consisted mostly of women, children and the elderly. The
cries of
lost children were pitiful to hear. NKPA soldiers were often found
among the
refugees. We heard rumors of No Gun Ri and similar "atrocities" of
war.
Most military units raced from one
area to
another, attempting to plug leaks in the lines. As a medical unit, we
remained
largely in areas with roads, depending on vehicles for evacuation of
wounded
and sick to rear echelons. Thievery of vehicles for use at the front
was
commonplace especially from rear echelons; it was a simple matter to
change a vehicle's
numbers. Jeeps and 2 1/2 ton trucks were especially favored.
Triage of wounded was often
difficult --
and makeshift. MASH units appeared to be well-supplied, and seemed to
be the
darlings of the medical service; they were often not in a position
logistically
to receive our
wounded, because of shifting lines and
other reasons, except when we were in the Pusan Perimeter when combat
lines
stabilized somewhat. On
occasion we would evacuate
wounded directly to Navy hospital ships III offshore, and
they were invaluable; on other occasions, we evacuated directly from
combat
areas to Japan, utilizing DC3 supply flights - - returning to Japan for
a
reload of supplies and personnel.
SUPPLY PROBLEMS -- throughout my
tenure
(Jul 50 - Feb 51) supplies
continued to be a problem. Shifting lines were the smaller part of the
difficulty. Much of the medical supplies and equipment for battalion
and
regimental use was inappropriate to a highly mobile front line unit. Disposables
were always in short supply, including dressings, small instruments,
local anesthetics, sutures; antibiotics, particularly penicillin for
injection
and tetracycline’s for oral administration were either
shorted on our
requisitions or non-existent. I had the impression that supply
sergeants along
the pipeline were subject to bribes to assure a properly filled
requisition; my
supply people assured me of the existence of such conditions, and this
hampered
our ability to deliver better care. Following development of the Pusan
Perimeter, the supply situation was improved, a
reflection apparently of stabilized lines and an improved thepipeline from
the ZI.
UNIQUE ILLNESSES -Japanese B
encephalitis; hepatitis A --- both required evacuation.
An interesting disorder -- plantar warts, which required evacuation
because of
unavailability of treatment methodologies (I was given to understand
that this
was treated in
Japan
by surgical excision, resulting in considerable and prolonged
incapability of
foot soldiers). I developed a means of retaining ill and minimally
wounded men
in the regimental areas while they recuperated, if possible; they were
then
able to return to duty more promptly, rather than being evacuated which
took
time, and then following the reassignment pipelines back to the
frontlines
which also took time. A medical "holding area" at Division level
would have been of considerable assistance for the “walking
wounded” and ill,
and freed up our mobility.
Local Koreans were often
“employed” to
assist with chores, which freed up US personnel for combat duties; they
were
often unskilled, although many of them had held skilled jobs prior
to the Police Action. On movement northward following the landing at
Inchon,
we encountered considerable
evidence of NKPA destruction of cities, and the systematic murder of
civilians,
many of whom were said to be local politicians and the educated.
Taejon,
in particular was
almost leveled, and had many burial trenches filled with dead
local people who had been killed just prior to our
arrival -- all ages, both sexes.
Food supplies were chaotic; our
staff of
cooks were clever in supplementing the meager rations with locally
obtained
fare. Many of the 1 and 5-man rations were WWII in origin; while not
spoiled,
they were often tasteless and obviously deteriorated because of
age/storage
conditions. Clothing, including sleeping bags was very late in
arriving; many
troops sought refuge from the snow in abandoned local housing,
particularly
since tentage was in very short supply early on, and what was available
was
often deteriorated from prolonged storage following WWII. Abandoned
schools
were a favorite. Site for medical and CP locations; schoolyards made
good motor
pool locations. Fuel was generally adequate. I am not familiar with
ordnance or
munitions supply problems, but heard many complaints.
I did not have the
“privilege” of being part of TFS (Task
Force Smith), which met the enemy near Osan, but arrived with the
remnants of
the original TFS 2 weeks after their introduction to combat. They were
obviously garrison soldiers, not well trained in warfare, but their
determination
to see their mission properly handled was remarkable. The downsizing of
American military forces following WWII contributed in no small measure
to the
failures of US forces throughout the Korean conflict, and must never be
allowed
to repeat. Freedom is not Free!
